Analysis of the US Post 9/11 Afghan Policy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55544/ijrah.6.2.11Keywords:
Strategy, Military Action, Terrorist, Humanitarian, DevelopmentAbstract
This paper describes how, following the 9/11 attacks, US policy in Afghanistan was molded and altered. It focuses on four primary techniques taken by four different administrations: George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. Each government took a distinct method based on its own goals, security concerns, and views regarding the Afghan conflict. The analysis first looks at the Bush administration, which initiated the “War on Terror,” overthrew the Taliban rule, and tried to construct a new Afghan state. Then it analyzes Obama’s approach, which raised force levels, focused on counterinsurgency, and pushed for long‑term stabilization. The report also examines Trump's approach, which favored a political settlement through the Doha negotiations while lowering American commitments. Lastly, it describes Biden's strategy, which resulted in the end of America's two-decade military presence and the full withdrawal of American forces in 2021.
The article outlines key objectives, successes, and difficulties during these four stages. It shows how military pressure, nation‑building efforts, counterterrorism, regional collaboration, and peace discussions all shaped Afghanistan’s security and political situation. The study also highlights how long-term success was hampered by inadequate planning, shoddy institutions, corruption, and a lack of sustainable policies. All things considered, this study offers a straightforward perspective of how U.S. policy changed over the course of 20 years and how each tactic influenced Afghanistan's destiny. Additionally, it provides helpful information for future policy decisions and for averting similar catastrophes in the area.
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