Constitutional Silences, Executive Power, and Democratic Fragility in Small States

Abstract

This article examines how constitutional silence, understood as the absence of clear rules on emergency authority, delegated legislation, appointments, legislative oversight, and ex ante constitutional review, creates opportunities for executive aggrandizement in small states. The argument is that democratic fragility often arises not only from openly authoritarian legal texts but also from ambiguities that allow concentrated political actors to expand power under the rhetoric of necessity, speed, or national interest. In small political systems, where institutions are often thinly staffed and personal networks are dense, constitutional gaps can become structural pathways for domination. Drawing on contemporary democracy and rule-of-law scholarship, the article argues for a design-oriented response: stronger parliamentary controls, enforceable judicial review, protected minority rights, and constitutional clarity on delegated authority. The core claim is that democratic endurance depends as much on constitutional precision as on constitutional aspiration.