Cyberfraud as Political Economy: Regulation, Enforcement, and Digital Vulnerability in Developing States

Abstract

This article analyzes cyberfraud not as isolated online deception but as a political-economy problem rooted in weak regulation, transnational criminal infrastructure, and uneven state capacity. It argues that developing states face a distinctive vulnerability because digital adoption has outpaced the institutional maturation of policing, financial intelligence, consumer protection, data governance, and cross-border legal cooperation. Contemporary fraud markets are increasingly industrialized, technology-enabled, and integrated with trafficking, money laundering, and illicit online marketplaces. The article contends that effective response requires a shift from reactive victim-focused policing to system-level disruption of criminal infrastructure. Priority areas include payment surveillance, beneficial ownership transparency, platform accountability, digital literacy, and treaty-based cooperation on electronic evidence. Cyberfraud, in this framing, is not merely a criminal-law issue; it is a governance stress test for digitally exposed but institutionally uneven states.